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doctrines about Jesus’s divinity and the Church’s message about him are
probably true.
For all of the book’s strengths, there are some notable weaknesses in it.
In a text that only briefly skims the surface of issues that can literally determine how one evaluates the fundamental truth claims of Christianity,
Swinburne might have offered some bibliographical resources at the end
of each chapter (or at the end of the book) for the reader to pursue. Lastly,
Swinburne does not mention anyone with views that are different from
or even contrary to his own. In the same vein, it is troubling that he does
not spend more time elaborating on the challenges that other religious
scholars pose to the a posteriori evidence for Christian theism (from, say,
Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.). Thus, a little more negative
apologetics would have illuminated his overall argument. Undoubtedly
there will be New Testament scholars who will gainsay the evidence that
Swinburne marshals in favor of certain components of Jesus’s pre-Easter
teaching and ministry. Unfortunately, he does not inform the reader of
the bewildering amount of disagreement that currently exists among New
Testament specialists in this regard (for example, Dale Allison and Raymond Brown are two reputable scholars who would deny that Jesus proclaimed his own deity during his lifetime).
This is not just another apologetics book. John Paul II’s clarion call for
Christian philosophers and fundamental theologians to defend the faith is
clearly embodied in Was Jesus God? In spite of its minor omissions, those
who seek to give reasons for Christian faith might well examine Swinburne’s newest book. It will give plenty of food for thought.

Moral Skepticisms, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Oxford University Press,
2006. Pp. xiv + 271. $85.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper)
E. J. COFFMAN, University of Tennessee
This book argues for two main conclusions: Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism
(we should suspend judgment on the question of whether any moral beliefs are epistemically justified) and Moderate Moral Skepticism (moral beliefs
can be “modestly justified” but not “extremely justified”—more on these
terms below). Sinnott-Armstrong calls the conjunction of these claims
Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism.
The book has two main parts. In Part I, Sinnott-Armstrong’s main
goals are (a) to identify the best arguments for the conclusion that there
is no moral knowledge (chapters 2–4) and (b) to develop an argument
for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism (chapters 5–6). Chapter 1 helpfully sets
the stage by distinguishing moral epistemology from other areas within
moral theory. In Part II, Sinnott-Armstrong builds a case for Moderate
Moral Skepticism by evaluating four replies to (what he regards as) one of
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the strongest arguments against moral knowledge (which he presents in
§4.3.1): a version of the familiar regress argument against justified belief in
general, applied specifically to moral beliefs. The four non-skeptical positions in moral epistemology that Sinnott-Armstrong assesses in Part II are
Naturalism (some moral beliefs are inferentially justified by non-normative
beliefs), Normativism (some moral beliefs are inferentially justified by nonmoral normative beliefs), Intuitionism (some justified moral beliefs don’t
owe their justification to any other beliefs), and Coherentism (some moral
beliefs are justified by virtue of their coherence with other beliefs). Sinnott-Armstrong argues that while some of these positions provide reason
to think there could be “modestly justified” moral beliefs, none provides
any reason to think moral beliefs could be “extremely justified.’ His overall verdict about the regress argument against justified moral belief that
structures Part II is this: the argument fails when put in terms of “modest
justification” but succeeds when put in terms of “extreme justification.”
This book has much to recommend it. It is accessible, engaging, comprehensive, and novel; even those previously unfamiliar with the issues
Sinnott-Armstrong engages will enjoy learning a lot of moral epistemology from it (as did I). That’s not to say, of course, that the book is an unmitigated success. Indeed, I think the failure of Sinnott-Argument’s argument for Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism is overdetermined. I’ll
try to justify this negative verdict after relaying the main line of argument
in Moral Skepticisms.
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism runs
as follows. You are justified in believing P only if you are justified in believing P “out of the relevant contrast class” (p. 94), where a contrast class
for P is a set of mutually excluding propositions containing P (p. 85). You
are justified in believing P out of a given contrast class, C, “when and only
when [you are] able to rule out all other members of C but [are] not able
to rule out P” (p. 86). So, to be justified in believing P, you must be “able to
rule out” any “relevant alternative” to P.
What enables you to rule out a proposition? A “believer’s grounds”
(p. 86) are what enable the believer to rule out alternatives to P:
The believer would not have this ability without some grounds that would
rule out the alternatives, but the believer need not consciously think about
these grounds or use them in any procedure in order to be able to rule out
the alternatives. Moreover, grounds can rule out alternatives without being
conclusive. They can be fallible and defeasible, uncertain and incomplete.
. . . The needed grounds might include perception, memory, introspection,
reflection, testimony, or any kind of justificatory procedure. (p. 87)

Further, Sinnott-Armstrong contends that the following “three conditions
are all necessary for a ground to provide any positive epistemic support”
(p. 68): the ground is “(a) not neutral between competing beliefs . . . ; and
also (b) not undermined . . . ; and also (c) not question-begging” (p. 68).
Throughout the book, expressions like ‘non-question-begging ground for
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P’ mean something like ‘ground that enables one to present a non-questionbegging argument for P’ (cf. pp. 79–80, 150, 161–166, 235–236).
On the account of epistemic justification Sinnott-Armstrong proposes,
then, you are justified in believing P only if you have grounds that enable
you to present a non-question-begging argument against any relevant alternative to P (cf. p. 94). But “deep problems arise for every attempt to
specify which contrast class is the one that is really relevant” (p. 98). Now
Sinnott-Armstrong correctly notes that “[t]his difficulty in determining
which contrast class is relevant does not entail that there is no fact of the
matter about which contrast class is relevant” (p. 129). But he goes on to
claim that “in the absence of any idea about how to settle on one contrast
class as opposed to other candidates, it seems better to avoid any claim
that any contrast class is the relevant one” (p. 129). That is, we should
“give up the notion of real relevance and suspend belief about whether or
not any contrast class is really relevant or the relevant one” (p. 103). Accordingly, we should suspend judgment on the question of whether any
particular belief is justified—moral beliefs included.
That is the argument for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism. Now for SinnottArmstrong’s case for Moderate Moral Skepticism (moral beliefs can be
“modestly justified” but not “extremely justified”). You are modestly justified in believing P iff you are able to rule out every member of the “modest
contrast class for P” except P itself (p. 90). The modest contrast class for P is
the set containing P along with “all propositions contrary to P that need
to be [ruled out] in order to meet the usual epistemic standards”—i.e.,
“the standards that people usually apply,” which we can learn “simply by
doing a survey to determine [what most people think] must be ruled out
for a belief to be justified” (p. 89). You are extremely justified in believing P
if you are able to rule out all members of the “extreme contrast class for
P” save P itself (p. 90). The extreme contrast class for P is the set containing
P along with “all propositions contrary to P, including skeptical scenarios
that are systematically uneliminable” (p. 89).
Moderate Moral Skepticism amounts to this: while a person could (in
principle) rule out all other (“non-P”) members of the modest contrast class
for some moral proposition P, no one could (even in principle) rule out
all other members of the extreme contrast class for P. Throughout Part II,
Sinnott-Armstrong suggests a number of ways one might gain modest justification to believe some moral propositions (see, e.g., pp. 140, 150–151,
166–167, 250). But the following argument that no one could be extremely justified in believing any moral proposition survives: Moral Nihilism
(“nothing is morally wrong or required, good or bad, and so on” [36]) is
a member of the extreme contrast class for any moral proposition. And
Moral Nihilism
is constructed so as to leave no way to rule it out. Since moral nihilists question all of our beliefs that anything is morally wrong, and so on, they leave
us with no moral starting points on which to base arguments against them
without begging the question at issue. If we cannot start from moral premis-
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es, then the only way to refute moral nihilism is to derive moral conclusions
from morally neutral premises, but all such attempts are subject to strong
criticisms from many philosophers, not only moral skeptics. So there seems
to be no way to rule out moral nihilism. (p. 79)

But we can be extremely justified in believing some moral proposition only
if we can rule out Moral Nihilism. Moderate Moral Skepticism follows.
We now have before us Sinnott-Armstrong’s main line of argument in
Moral Skepticisms. I’ll close by raising two worries about it.
First, an objection to the argument for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism. Recall the following key premise of that argument: Since “deep problems
arise for every attempt to specify which contrast class is the one that is really relevant” (p. 98), we should “give up the notion of real relevance and
suspend belief about whether or not any contrast class is really relevant
or the relevant one” (p. 103). I disagree. Suppose you accept Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of epistemic justification, along with his view that we
have no “idea about how to settle on one contrast class as opposed to other
candidates” (p. 129). Still, we often have excellent reason to countenance a
phenomenon despite lacking a satisfactory theory of it. I think this is true
of “real relevance” (assuming, for present purposes, Sinnott-Armstrong’s
account of justification). It’s exceedingly plausible that you are justified
in believing (say) that you exist. But if you’re justified in believing that
you exist (E), then (by Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of justification) some
contrast class for E is the relevant one. Or, to put it a bit differently, some
alternatives to E are the relevant alternatives to E. So, we have excellent
reason to think there is such a thing as “real relevance”—notwithstanding
the (alleged) fact that “deep problems arise for every attempt to specify
which contrast class is the one that is really relevant.”
Second, an objection to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Moderate
Moral Skepticism. As we’ve seen, that argument depends crucially on the
claim that there’s “no way to rule out moral nihilism.” And that claim depends crucially on Sinnott-Armstrong’s view that you can rule P out only if
you have some non-question-begging ground for ~P, some ground that enables you to present a non-question-begging argument against P. But this
is much too strong a requirement to place on our ordinary notion of ruling
out, which is what Sinnott-Armstrong means to invoke (cf. p. 78). Suppose
I believe (via introspection) that I’m thinking, and infer from this that I exist. Now if we can ever rule anything out—and Sinnott-Armstrong thinks
we can: recall, e.g., his commitment to the possibility of modestly justified
moral beliefs—, then I can rule out the proposition I don’t exist. But as far as
I can see, none of my grounds enables me to present a non-question-begging argument for the thesis that I exist. In particular, my introspectionbased belief that I’m thinking doesn’t enable me to present a non-questionbegging argument that I exist. Whatever exactly it is for an argument to
beg the question, “I’m thinking, so I exist” seems to achieve it.
The upshot is that a person can have the ability to rule out a proposition even if she lacks non-question-begging grounds for the denial of that
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proposition. But then the (alleged) fact that we lack non-question-begging
grounds for the denial of Moral Nihilism doesn’t entail that we can’t rule
out Moral Nihilism: Even if we lack non-questioning-begging grounds
against Moral Nihilism, we may nevertheless be able to rule it out. At a
minimum, if Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Moderate Moral Skepticism is to succeed, he will need to defend it from the objection that he has
tied the epistemic notion of being able to rule out too tightly to the dialectical notion of being able to present a non-question-begging argument against.

Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays, edited by Paul K. Moser. Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. 236. $64.00 (cloth), $25.00 (paper)
MICHAEL W. AUSTIN, Eastern Kentucky University
This new collection of essays explores the philosophical relevance of the
founder of the Christian movement, Jesus of Nazareth. The book includes
contributions from Old and New Testament scholars, theologians, and
philosophers. In the introduction, philosopher Paul Moser engages in
a substantive discussion of the similarities and differences between the
movements born in Jerusalem and Athens. The movement of the disciples
of Jesus and the center of Western philosophy share a concern for truth,
and seek knowledge of the truth. Moser characterizes Athens as the birthplace of a wisdom movement in which humans are moral and intellectual
agents in pursuit of a good life. Jerusalem, on the other hand, through
Jesus, Paul, and others, is a Good News power movement. This movement
offers more than wisdom. It offers power to human beings, the power of
comprehensive redemption (spiritual, moral, and physical). Moser takes
philosophy to be a kerygmatic discipline, at least when we consider the
disciplinary impact of the person of Jesus on it. For the Good News power movement of Jesus, what matters most is love of God and then love
of neighbor as ourselves. In light of this, all human projects, including
philosophical projects, should contribute to the satisfaction of these love
commands. Philosophy should go beyond mere discussion and move into
obedience mode. That is, a discussion of the perennial questions of philosophy has value, but philosophers must engage in their discussions in
compliance with the divine love commands. Moreover, philosophers and
others should not be satisfied with mere discussion, but should be receptive to God’s love and in turn motivated to follow and obey God from the
heart. The three sections of the book—Jesus in His First Century Thought
Context, Jesus in Medieval Philosophy, and Jesus in Contemporary Philosophy—expound on these issues in order to more fully grasp the relevance
of Jesus of Nazareth to philosophy as an intellectual discipline.
In the first section of the book, the chapter by Craig Evans includes
an analysis of the available sources that contain information about the

